Committee Selection with Non-Proportional Weights
| dc.contributor.author | Yucheng, Sun | |
| dc.contributor.author | Haifeng, Yu | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ruomu, Hou | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-05T05:24:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-09-05T05:24:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-08-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Committees are extensively used in the designs of various Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. A committee is simply a randomly selected subset of the parties/nodes in the system. Ideally, the committee should i) be as small as possible, and ii) properly represent the entire system, in terms of the corruption ratio. Existing committee selection schemes all follow the principle of proportionality, which says that a committee member should neither over-represent nor under-represent the stake it holds. In this work, highly surprisingly, we discover that proportionality actually leads to sub-optimal designs. Namely, better security and smaller committee size can be achieved when parties overrepresent/under-represent their stakes. We then explore such nonproportional designs, and show that they can help to reduce error by many orders of magnitude, under realistic settings and real-world stake distributions of 6 major cryptocurrencies. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.comp.nus.edu.sg/handle/1900.100/19308 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | TRA8/25 | |
| dc.title | Committee Selection with Non-Proportional Weights |