An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets
| dc.contributor.author | LIU, Qing | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | LUO, Tie | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | TANG, Ruiming | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | BRESSAN, Stephane | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-23T06:59:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-23T06:59:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker’s payment.We examine the profitability, individually rationality, computationally efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our study analytically shows that one of the mechanisms, called TruTeam, is superior to the others particularly due to its computationally efficiency and truthfulness. Furthermore, our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dl.comp.nus.edu.sg/xmlui/handle/1900.100/4832 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | TR10/14; | en_US |
| dc.title | An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets | en_US |
| dc.type | Technical Report | en_US |