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An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets

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dc.contributor.author LIU, Qing en_US
dc.contributor.author LUO, Tie en_US
dc.contributor.author TANG, Ruiming en_US
dc.contributor.author BRESSAN, Stephane en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-23T06:59:42Z
dc.date.available 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z en_US
dc.date.available 2017-01-23T06:59:42Z
dc.date.issued 2014-10-20T08:36:51Z en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1900.100/4832 en_US
dc.description.abstract In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker’s payment.We examine the profitability, individually rationality, computationally efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our study analytically shows that one of the mechanisms, called TruTeam, is superior to the others particularly due to its computationally efficiency and truthfulness. Furthermore, our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries TR10/14; en_US
dc.title An Efficient and Truthful Pricing Mechanism for Team Formation in Crowdsourcing Markets en_US
dc.type Technical Report en_US


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